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STUDENT MATERIAL
Notes
BALLOT ACCESS LAWS IN WEST VIRGINIA-A CALL
FOR CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The nominees of the Republican and Democratic parties automatically appear
on the general election ballot in West Virginia. The ability of candidates outside
of the two major parties to have their names printed on the general election ballot
is determined by ballot access laws in the Election Code of West Virginia. Simply
stated, a nonmajor party candidate' must collect a certain number of petition
signatures to demonstrate public support before his name can be placed on the
ballot.2 The various rules which dictate how those signatures are obtained, however,
have combined to make ballot access a very difficult task.
The initial sections of this Note review the historical and constitutional
backgrounds of ballot access laws. Since 1968, there has been an increase in judicial
activity nationwide challenging restrictive ballot access laws. Two recent cases, Liber-
tarian Party v. Manchin3 and Anderson v. Celebrezze,4 have rendered certain por-
tions of West Virginia's ballot access laws unconstitutional. However, the West
Virginia Legislature has not amended the statutory requirements for ballot access
since 1941.
With the election of a new secretary of state in 1984, there has been talk of
a major reform of West Virginia's election laws as a whole.5 It is important that
such a complete overhaul should also include revisions to our ballot access laws.
The final portion of this Note proposes revisions to bring West Virginia's statutory
requirements within constitutional guarantees.
II. HISTOICAL BACKGROUND
Political parties, as we know them today, did not exist at the time of the writing
of the United States Constitution. 6 The Constitution does not explicitly mention
I The term "nonmajor party candidates" is used herein to include both minor party and
independent candidates. The term "major party" is used to refer to officially recognized parties, normally
the Democrates and Republicans. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
2 See W. VA. CODE §§ 3-5-22 to 24 (1979).
Libertarian Party v. Manchin, 270 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 802 (1980).
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
Election Campaign Reform Proposed, Morgantown Dominion-Post, February 20, 1985, at B12,
col. 1.
6 See generally E. ROBIN sON, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN PoLiTcAL PARTIEs (1924); P.Ac-
TICAL PoLTrrIcS IN THE UNrTED STATES (C. Cotter ed. 1969). In fact, the founding fathers sought to avoid
political parties on the premise that they were a threat to the cohesiveness of the new union. Many
authors addressed this issue, including James Madison, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson.
See THE MAciNo OF THlE AmE~icAN PARTY SYsTEm 1789 to 1809. (N. Cunningham ed. 1965).
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political parties, nor is the present two party system mandated as the official political
framework in America.7 Political parties began as loose coalitions bound together
by a common doctrine or specific program. Some of these groups consisted of per-
sonal followings, 8 some were of regional origin, 9 and others were based on economic
interests. As national issues began to dominate American politics,'0 these factions
aligned themselves into two opposing groups which clashed on a national scale.
Thus, even in the early days of our republic, political activity centered around two
major parties.
This fundamental two party alignment has continued to the present day. The
entrenchment of the two party system may be traced to several factors, including
the winner take all electoral system," voting habits, 2 and, more recently, barriers
to third party ballot access.' 3 Yet, despite the prevalent two party pattern, third
parties have persistently managed to have a positive impact on American politics.
Because of their unique role in our political scheme, the existence of third parties
should be encouraged. One way to accomplish this is to standardize the laws which
inhibit their access to our political system.
Many third parties have received significant voting percentages in presidential
elections." Strong third parties have appeared in nearly every election, with the
exceptions of the period of Reconstruction after the Civil War and the Great
7 But cf. A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY; THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND
THE PARTY SYSTEM 85 (1971) ("The states are entitled to put some store by the two party system and
they ought to have the power to give it a certain edge." Id. at 85).
' The party of Alexander Hamilton supported a strong central government. It was opposed by
the followers of Thomas Jefferson, who advocated the return of power to the states. E. ROBINsON,
supra note 6, at 62-74.
' Various views were held by representatives of cities on the East Coast, the western settlers,
landholders, planters, and immigrants. Id. at 20-21.
,o Early debate focused on the adoption of the Constitution, see THE FEDERAUST No. 10 (J.
Madison); the constitutionality of a national bank, see N. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 32-36; and
foreign policy, see E. ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 65-66.
11 D. MAZmAN AN, TiRuD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2 (1974). Mazmanian contends
that competition to gain the Presidency, as well as pressure to build nationwide coalitions, tends to
reduce the number of parties to two. Id. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 7.
E. ROBnqSON, supra note 6, at 6-7.
, See generally Note, Nominating Petition Requirements for Third Party and Independent Can-
didate Ballot Access, 11 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 974 (1977); Elder, Access to the Ballot by Political Can-
didates, 83 DICK. L. REv. 387 (1979).
" Significant Third Parties in Presidential Elections, 1828-1972
Percentage
of total
Year Party votes cast
1832 Anti-Mason 8.0
1848 Free Soil 10.1
1856 American 21.4
[Vol. 87
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Depression.' 5 This pattern may be attributed to several factors. Whenever an
intensely controversial issue appears, the two major parties are likely to appeal
to the majority of the electorate, leaving an angry and unrepresented minority.' 6
This situation creates the opportunity for the minority to unite into a third party.
17
In this way, major issues are highlighted and dramatized and the major parties
are forced into addressing them. 8
1860 Breckinridge Democratic 18.2
Constitutional Union 12.6
1892 Populist 8.5
1912 Theodore Roosevelt Progressive 27.4
Socialist 6.0
1924 La Follette Progressive 16.6
1968 American Independent 13.5
a The vote for the Republican party was 23.2 percent, making the vote of the short-lived Progressive
party the second highest of the election.
Copyright © 1974, D. MAZMANAN, THmi PARTas IN PRESIDENTIL ELECTIONS, Brookings Institution.
Reprinted by permission.
11 Id. at 66. The absence of third parties may be attributed to the intensity of the conflict, which
tends to split voters into two evenly divided parties and excludes third parties from the necessary sup-
port they need.
' Id.
17 Coincidence of Intense Conflict on Issues and Significant
Third-Party Vote in Presidential Elections, 1818-1972
Issues in conflict Third party and election year?
Egalitarianism Anti-Mason: 1832
New territories, nativism, and slavery Free Soil: 1848
American: 1856
Breckinridge Democratic: 1860
Constitutional Union: 1860
Reconstruction none
Agrarian protest Populist: 1892
Corporate regulation and government Theodore Roosevelt Progressive: 1912
responsiveness Socialist: 1912
La Follette Progressive: 1924
Great Depression none
Civil rights and Vietnam war American Independent: 1968
a Dominant issues in periods of intense conflict defined by William Nisbet Cambers, "Crisis Politics,
USA, 1789-1971" (St. Louis: Washington University, 1972; processed); and Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political
Oppositions in Western Democracies (Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 34-69.
b Year in which third party won at least 5.6 percent of presidential vote.
Copyright © 1974, D. MzAiN, THmD PAgRms IN PREsMENTiAL ELECTIONS, Brookings Institution.
Reprinted by permission.
" Id. at 67.
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For example, the Free Soilers of 1848 compelled the country to address the
question of slavery. 9 Later in the same century, the Populist Party (1892) voiced
the concerns of discontented farmers. 2' Demand for political and economic reform
was a key controversy that was publicized by the Bull Moose21 and Socialist 22 parties
in 1912. A more contemporary illustration of this function of third parties is pro-
vided by George Wallace and his American Independent Party, whose stands on
segregation and military strength in Vietnam appealed to a substantial number of
Americans in 1968.23 At various times throughout our nation's history, issues such
as railroad regulation,24 progressive income taxation, 21 social insurance, 6 and child
labor laws27 were campaign causes of third parties which later became governmen-
tal policy.
Even with recognition of the historical contributions of third parties, some
scholars still categorize them as contrary to the American political process. 2' These
scholars allege that third parties threaten the stability of the political system, by
encouraging extremism which would potentially deadlock the nation into unresolvable
conflict. 29 The continuing dominance of the two party system demonstrates that
this has not occurred. The criticism that third parties could prevent a majority in
the electoral college also has not been justified.3 ' Although a third party can capture
votes that might have gone to a major party,3' in all elections with significant third
parties, the majority candidate won with over fifty percent of the electoral votes.32
" Id. at 36-39. The Free-Soiler Party later merged into the Republican Party. Id. at 39.
20 W. HESSELTINE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THIRD PARmTs: FROM ANTI-MASONRY TO WALLACE
16 (1957). See also D. MAZmANLAN, supra note 11, at 51.
21 W. HESSELTINE, supra note 20, at 19-27. The Bull Moose Party could be termed the most
successful of all third parties. Running on a platform of issues like women's suffrage, regulation of
corporations, and direct primaries, the party captured 88 electoral votes, running second to Woodrow
Wilson with 435. Id. at 26-27.
22 Id. at 34-41. The main thrust of the party platform was the struggle between wage earners
and capitalists. The Socialist candidate, Eugene V. Debs, received 900,000 votes; also, many state and
local offices were held by Socialists. Id. at 37.
23 D. MAzmANIAN, supra note 11, at 24.
24 W. HESSELTINE, supra note 20, at 37 (Populist Party).
20 Id. at 38 (Socialist Party).
21 D. MAzmANiAN, supra note 11, at 81 (Progressive Party).
27 W. HESSELTINE, supra note 20, at 21 (Bull Moose Party).
28 See A. BICKEL, supra note 7; Barton, The General Election Ballot: More Nominees or More
Representative Nominees?, 22 STAN: L. REv. 165 (1970).
20 D. MAzmANtN, supra note 11, at 68-69.
30 Id. at 69.
", Id. at 69-74. "The final outcome of the three-party contests of 1848, 1856, 1860, 1892, 1912,
and 1968 might have been changed by eliminating third parties, for the victors won by pluralities."
Id. at 70.
12 Id. at 69.
[Vol. 87
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The important role played by third parties in representing minority interests
clearly outweighs the negative effects on the two party system. Moreover, a third
party appeals to voting groups who would not ordinarily be involved in politics,
thereby increasing overall voter participation.33 Third parties can also have an effect
on public policymaking. 3 At the outset, the issues addressed by third parties are
generally minority views. However, many of these ideas may be adopted in response
to public demand by the major parties and translated into public policy. Therefore,
third parties help to refine and distill creative new ideas, thus filling an indispen-
sable role in our political system.
The success of the third party, at least in the early days, may have been
attributed to the absence of barriers to their formation. Up until 1888, any group
that wished to compete in an election would simply print and distribute its own
ballots.3 5 The only responsibility of the government was to count the ballots. The
potential for abuse of this system prompted a call for government administered
elections6.3 By making the government responsible for printing, distributing, and
counting the ballots, the potential for corruption of elections was diminished.
However, the major parties soon recognized that restricting ballot access was a
method to eliminate third party competition.
Early ballot access requirements were put in place at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Ironically, the stated purpose of these laws was to limit the number
of less" significant offices and to ensure the integrity of the election process.3 7 At
first, the requirements for third party candidates were minimal. 38 As the years went
on, however, the laws became more and more restrictive, thus ensuring the perpetua-
tion of the Democratic and Republican parties. In many states the tightening of
these laws followed the campaigns of Teddy Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party in 191239
and Robert LaFollette's Progressive Party in 1924.40
The 1940s brought even tighter restrictions on third parties. With patriotic fer-
vor generated by the war, the states attempted to restrict the access of leftist parties
such as the Communists and the Socialists |. 4 By the election of 1948, Henry Wallace's
" Id. at 77.
I d. at 81.
" Id. at 90.
36 Id.
Elder, supra note 13, at 389.
" D. MAZiiANiAN, supra note 11, at 90.
" W. HESSELTINE, supra note 20.
10 The Progressive Party was the last party to achieve ballot access in all states. However, due
to legal technicalities, the party appeared on the ballot under a variety of names, thus cutting down
on the effectiveness of its campaign. LaFollette captured 17% of the popular vote. D. MAzMANIAN,
supra note I1, at 92.
41 Id.
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Progressive Party was thwarted by filing deadlines and petition requirements.42
Although the Progressive Party received significant support in some areas, ballot
access restrictions prevented them from running in many states.43 As a result of
the 1948 election, some states passed legislation further restricting ballot access.4
Twenty years would pass before a third party candidate again gained sufficient
support to mount a serious presidential challenge.
In 1968, Alabama Governor George Wallace emerged as a presidential con-
tender. Backed by a coalition of conservative voters, Wallace was preferred by twenty
percent of the electorate, according to preelection polls. ' s Yet his efforts to be placed
on the ballot were hindered by tough ballot access requirements in many states.46
Wallace's legal challenge to Ohio's ballot access provisions resulted in a favorable
decision in Williams v. Rhodes, the landmark case on judicial review of ballot access
questions.
4 7
IIl. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS IN BALLOT AccEss CHALLENGES
A. Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights and the Standard of Judicial Scrutiny
The standard of judicial scrutiny applied by the United States Supreme Court
in a ballot access challenge is based, in part, upon the Court's recognition of two
constitutionally guaranteed, fundamental rights: "the right of individuals to associate
for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless
of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." S The Court has
repeatedly and emphatically held each of these freedoms to be protected against
federal encroachment by the first amendment 9 and against state infringement by
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 0 Indeed, the right to
a meaningful vote of equal weight in government elections has been placed among
this country's most precious and fundamental rights."
,2 Id. at 93.
• Id at 93-95.
During this period 37 states had petition requirements, 60% of the states had provisions dis-
qualifying communist or subversive parties and 16 states had early filing deadlines. Id. at 95-96.
41 Id. at 96.
46 Id.
'7 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
" Id. at 30.
" The first amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the Freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
so Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31 (citing UMWA v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 381 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
The relevant portion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment reads: "No state
shall . . . deny to any person within this jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
" Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Williams, 393 U.S. 23.
[Vol. 87
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Although a right to candidacy has never been explicitly recognized as a fun-
damental right, the Court has implicitly elevated it to such a level by choosing
to employ a strict scrutiny standard of review. 2 Simply stated, if a challenger can
persuade the court that the classification is "suspect" or that a "fundamental right"
is impaired, the state-imposed restriction will be reviewed and struck down under
the strict scrutiny/compelling state interest test. If not, the Court will utilize the
rational relationship test which simply requires the state's classification to be related
to a legitimate state purpose and, in practice, the law is easily constitutionally
approved."
The right to form a party for the advancement of political ideas becomes, in
effect, an empty right if a party can be kept off the election ballot and therefore
denied an opportunity to win votes.-' Likewise, the right to vote is severely burdened
if that vote may be cast for only one of two parties "at a time when other parties
are clamoring for a place on the ballot."" Although the right to vote is fundamental
and the right to candidacy, for all practical purposes, is regarded by the courts
as "fundamental," not all state-imposed restrictions on candidates' eligibility for
the ballot will be considered constitutionally suspect. The Supreme Court has clearly
noted a state's interest in holding fair and honest elections in an orderly, rather
than a chaotic fashion. 6 Reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions protecting the
integrity of the electoral process have generally been upheld, including a state's
right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial voter sup-
port in order to qualify for a place on the ballot. 7
In a dissenting opinion in the 1968 landmark case, Williams v. Rhodes, 8 Chief
Justice Warren framed the precise question the Court must answer in each challenge
to a state's restrictions on the electoral process. He asked, "[tlo what extent may
a State, consistent with equal protection and the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of association, impose restrictions upon a candidate's desire to be placed
on the ballot?" 59 Since Williams, courts have relied on basically two avenues of
protection: the first amendment" and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
12 See Note, Constitutional Law-Ballot-Access Restrictions and the First Amendment: Status
of the Right to Candidacy: Anderson v. Celebrezze, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 187 (1983). See also text
accompanying notes 105-08 infra.
13 See Comment, Equal Protection: Analyzing the Dimensions of a Fundamental Right-the Right
to Vote, 17 SANTA CLAA L. REv. 163 (1977).
"4 Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
" Id.
56 Id. at 31-32.
" In Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971), the Court recognized the State's interest in requiring
a candidate to make a "preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support." Id. at 442. As
of 1977, 35 states, including West Virginia, required the collection of signatures approximating a total
of one percent or less. See Note, supra note 13.
" Williams, 393 U.S. 23.
I d. at 69 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
60 See, e.g., Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61
Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964) (en banc).
1985]
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amendment.6 ' The courts must balance two competing interests: a state's right not
to encumber the ballot with the names of frivolous candidates and the constitu-
tionally uaranteed rights of minor party and independent candidates.
B. Recent Analysis-Anderson v. Celebrezze
The Court's most recent and notable articulation of the standard of review
applicable in ballot access cases came in 1983 with its five to four decision in
Anderson v. Celebrezze.62 This case arose out of John Anderson's attempt to be
placed on the Ohio ballot in the 1980 election as an independent candidate for
President of the United States. Ohio statutes required that an independent can-
didate file a statement of candidacy on or before March 20, 1980, which was also
the filing deadline for candidates in the primary election. 63 Anderson did not an-
nounce his independent candidacy until April 24, 1980. When his supporters at-
tempted to turn in the required nominating petitions and a statement of candidacy
on May 16, Ohio Secretary of State Anthony Celebrezze refused to accept them
because of the early filing deadline." Anderson and supporters filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio and successfully
challenged the constitutionality of the statute. 65 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment and ordered Anderson's name placed on the November general
election ballot. The district court held the statutory deadline unconstitutional on
two grounds. First, it dictated an impermissible burden on the first amendment
rights of Anderson and supporters. Second, the early filing deadline for indepen-
dent candidates, without similar requirements for political party nominees, violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 66
Celebrezze appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 67 The election was
held, however, while the appeal was pending. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the early deadline met the State's interest in furthering important state goals. 6
The decision conflicted with rulings in favor of Anderson in similar cases by the
61 See, e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. 23; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Some courts, including
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, have struck down restrictions on candidacy based on
a third rationale: right to candidacy is itself a fundamental right. See State ex rel Piccirillo v. City
of Follansbee, 160 W. Va. 329, 233 S.E.2d 419 (1977) (citing State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney,
159 W. Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607 (1976) (right to become a candidate for office is a fundamental right);
Mancuso, 476 F.2d 187 (candidacy is both a protected first amendment right and a fundamental interest)).
62 Anderson, 460 U.S. 780.
63 Id. at 782-86.
64 Id.
63 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
66 Id. at 125, 129.
67 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981).
6I Id. at 567.
[Vol. 87
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First and Fourth Circuits,69 thereby leading to review by the United States Supreme
Court.
In an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit decision and ruled that Ohio's early filing deadline placed an unconstitutional
burden on the voting and associational rights of Anderson's supporters.7"
The opinion began by reiterating the standard of review in ballot access cases:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evahiate the precise interests put for-
ward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing
judgment, the court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each
of those, interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make
it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.7
In effect, the Court was reaffirming its decision to apply strict scrunity analysis
in ballot access cases. In applying this standard, the Supreme Court agreed with
Anderson's contentions that Ohio's laws unduly restricted nonmajor party can-
didates. It recognized that the major parties' nominees are placed on the ballot
even though they are not chosen until the late summer conventions. Indeed, the
nominee might not have even run in the Ohio primary and yet, if selected at the
convention, may still be placed on the ballot, while the nonmajor party candidates
must qualify by mid-March."' To do so, they must have announced much earlier
than the March deadline and mobilized sufficient interest and support to collect
enough signatures by that time. Candidates and supporters within the major parties
thus had the political advantage of continued flexibility;" they did not adopt their
nominees or platforms until five months after the deadline for nonmajor party
candidates. 74
The Court acknowledged this unequal burden against nonmajor party candidates
and the resulting discrimination against independent-minded voters' associational
rights protected by the first amendment. These constitutional rights are abridged
by restrictive ballot access laws which tend to favor the two major parties. 5 The
69 See Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730 (D. Me. 1980), aff'd mem., 634 F.2d 616 (lst Cir.
1980); Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980).
, Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806.
, Id. at 789.
,2 Id. at 790-92. This was precisely the case in 1952 when General Eisenhower did not participate
in the primary elections and only later became the nominee of the Republican Party at the convention.
Anderson, 499 F. Supp. at 129.
71 Flexibility has become even more important in today's modern world. The media gives vast
coverage to elections, and developments may change at any time. Recent elections have been altered
by such occurrences as assassinations, foreign developments, and scandals.
"4 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 791.
11 Id. at 790-94.
1985]
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Court noted that the first amendment's firm commitment to "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debates is thwarted when election campaigns are monopolized by
existing political parties."6
The State of Ohio offered three arguments to support its ballot access laws:
voter education, equal treatment, and political stability." First, the Court recognized
the State's "important and legitimate interest" in ensuring that voters will be
educated and informed concerning the electoral process.78 In applying the judicial
balancing test of strict scrutiny,7' the Court refused to accept Ohio's proposition
that its interest in voter education justified the early filing deadline restriction. The
Court rejected Ohio's suggestion that it took more than seven months to inform
voters about the qualifications of a candidate merely because he lacks a partisan
label, given the mass communication capabilities in the modern world.80
Second, the Court rejected Ohio's claim that the early filing deadline served
the State's interest of treating all candidates equally.' Ohio contended that since
its deadline was the same as that for candidates in the major parties' primaries,
the nonmajor parties were accorded equal treatment. However, since major parties'
nominees appear on the ballot regardless of whether they had run in the primary,8"
the Court found that the deadline could not be considered the same for both, and
was, in practical effect, unequal treatment for nonmajor party candidates.
Finally, the Court disposed of the political stability argument by relying on
the earlier Ohio ballot access case of Williams v. Rhodes.82 Williams held that
"protecting the Republican and Democratic parties from external competition can-
not justify the virtual exclusion" of nonmajor party candidates."' The Court
reiterated its holding in Williams that first amendment freedoms and the preven-
tion of a "permanent monopoly" by two parties clearly outweigh the state's in-
terest in ensuring political-stability."5
The Court's disagreement as to the standard of review to be applied in ballot
access challenges is reflected by the dissenting opinion. 6 The dissent opposed the
majority's application of strict scrutiny analysis, preferring instead to apply minimal
scrutiny or a rational basis standard. A state's laws should be upheld if they
16 Id. at 794 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
71 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796.
7t Id.
11 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
10 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 797.
', Id. at 799.
," See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
11 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 802.
8" Id.
11 Id. (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 31-32).
11 Id. at 806. The four dissenting Justices were Rehnquist, White, Powell, and O'Connor.
[Vol. 87
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are "tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and [are] in no sense invidious
or arbitrary.""11 Ohio's attempt to ensure political stability by imposing an early
filing deadline would meet this test.88 However, since Williams, the Court has
consistently applied the majority-supported strict scrutiny standard. 9
As a result of the Anderson v. Celebrezze decision, it is unconstitutional to
require nonmajor party candidates to conform to deadlines earlier than those which
major party candidates are required to meet unless a state sufficiently satisfies the
compelling state interest test. In light of the Court's continued elevation of the
right to candidacy to the level of a fundamental right, it is highly likely that many
states' restrictions on ballot-access would not survive this stringent test of judicial
scrutiny.
IV. BALLOT ACCESS IN WEST VIRGINIA
A. History
The history of West Virginia ballot access law shows a steady progression of
tighter restrictions. The State's early ballot access legislation allowed a third party
candidate's name to be placed on the ballot by the submission of signatures rep-
resenting one percent of the votes cast for that office in the previous general
election, up to a maximum of one thousand.90 Voters could not sign more than
one nominating certificate, but did not forfeit their right to vote in the primary.
In the election of 1912, Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party finished second in the presiden-
tial race in West Virginia,9' the Progressive and Socialist parties managed to make
impressive showings in many races.92 In 1915, the West Virginia Legislature amended
the law by raising the signature requirement to five percent and lifting the one
thousand voter ceiling. Primary voters were precluded from signing nominating
certificates. The signature solicitation period, however, came after the primary. The
law also made those who both signed a petition and voted in the primary subject
:7 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973)).
" Id. at 818.
,9 See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 722 (1974) (state must show a compelling interest
to keep political minorities off the ballot); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335 (state must show a substantial and
compelling reason for imposing durational residence requirements).
90 1891 W. VA. ACTS 89, § 24. Brief for Appellant at 26, Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d 634.
91 WEST VIRGINIA LEoIsLATvE HANDBOOK AND MANUAL AND OFFIcIAL REGISTER (J. Harris, ed.)
(1916).
92 Brief, supra note 90, at 26. F. Barkey, The Socialist Party in West Virginia from 1898
to 1920: A Study in Working Class Radicalism 253, app. B, table III (1971) (unpublished manuscript
available from the West Virginia Collection of the West Virginia University Library), provides a complete
listing of Socialist Party candidates elected to office from 1910 to 1915. Their most successful year
was 1912 when four mayors, ten councilmen, four justices of the peace, four constables, and two members
of boards of education were elected in various races around the State.
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to criminal prosecution. 3 In 1923, the signature filing deadline was moved to before
the primary, forcing voters to choose between signing a petition or voting for their
preferred party. 9' This new deadline also forced nonmajor party candidates to an-
nounce and mobilize their campaigns much sooner.' A final revision to the laws
was made in 1941, following a concerted effort by the Communist Party to get
on the ballot.' 6 These amendments established the credential requirements and
magisterial district limitations for canvassers and certificate signers. 91
As a result of West Virginia's tough ballot access restrictions, only seven
nonmajor candidates qualified to be placed on the presidential ballot in the past
fifty years," making it one of the most restrictive states in which to achieve ballot
access.9 Consequently, West Virginians miss the benefits of a full political discussion
and, more importantly, lose the right to a variety of choices on election day. At
the present time, the West Virginia Legislature has not yet revised these statutes.
B. Analysis
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the 1980 case of West Virginia
Libertarian Party v. Manchin'°° chose to employ a balancing test in assessing the
constitutionality of ballot access restrictions. The court chose the balancing test
despite prior rulings that the right to run for office is a fundamental right entitled
to strict scrutiny analysis.' 0 '
Libertarian Party was a direct challenge to the ballot access requirements of
the West Virginia Code. The court noted that the appropriate analysis of an alleged
equal protection violation is "whether the state has imposed a significantly higher
burden on the independent or third-party candidate than it has imposed on major-
party candidates."' 2 The court's wording of the applicable standard of review in
93 1915 W. VA. AcTs 26, 8 23. In his manuscript, Dr. Barkey states "[tihe turning point in the
political fortures of the Mountain State Socialists appeared to be the passage of a primary election
law by the 1915 State Legislature. The Socialists felt that this bill, which passed easily as a reform
measure, was aimed directly at them." F. Barkey, supra note 92, at 175.
14 1923 W. VA. ACTS 23, § 3.
95 Id.
"' Brief, supra note 90, at 26-27.
" 1941 W. VA. ACTS 40.
" These candidates were Henry Wallace (1948), George Wallace (1968), Ed Clark and John Ander-
son (1980), Bob Richards, Mel Mason, and Dennis Serrette (1984).
" Comment, Ballot Access: Applying the Constitutional Balancing Test to the West Virginia Election
Code, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 227, 230 (1980), quoting CONGRESSioNAL QUARTERLY GUIDE TO UNITED STATES
ELECTIONS (1975 & Supp. 1976).
00 Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d 634.
"' See State exrel. Bromelow v. Daniel, 163 W. Va. 532, 258 S.E.2d 119 (1979); Marra v. Zink,
163 W. Va. 406, 256 S.E.2d 581 (1979); Piccirillo, 160 W. Va. 329, 233 S.E.2d 419; Maloney, 159
W. Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607; State ex rel. Brewer v. Wilson, 151 W. Va. 113, 150 S.E.2d 592 (1966).
'" Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d at 644 (citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31).
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strict scrutiny terms" 3 stands as an apparent anomaly since it does not "strictly"
apply the standard but instead uses a relaxed balancing test. The court looked at
three balancing factors: 1) whether the state's interest in ballot access limitations
outweighs the candidates' interest in securing a place on the ballot, 2) whether the
state statutes totally deprive an independent candidate or third party of ballot access,
and 3) whether less restrictive alternative means would adequately promote the state's
interest.'"4
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals closely followed the United States
Supreme Court in its equal protection analysis. However, the West Virginia court
is clearly more expansive in its recognition of a candidate's right to run for office
as a fundamental right. In State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee,"' the court
reiterated its 1966 holding in Brewer v. Wilson' °6 that the right to become a can-
didate for election to public office is a "valuable and fundamental right.' ' 7
Therefore, it is entitled to constitutional protection under the equal protection clause
and the first amendment. These constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of
association and speech are paralleled in Article III of the West Virginia
Constitution.'0
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly held that
the right to candidacy is a fundamental right although implicitly treating it as such.
The West Virginia court's approach appears to be a more relaxed constitutional
balancing test than tradtional strict scrutiny analysis. The balancing occurs when
the state is required to justify any restriction under the three factors listed above
before it will be constitutionally upheld.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The time has come for a major revision of the sections of the West Virginia
Election Code pertaining to ballot access. The Libertarian Party and Anderson cases
have revealed that several provisions of the Code are unconstitutional, while deci-
sions in other jurisdictions suggest additional modifications of our laws. A piecemeal
response by the secretary of state to developments in the case law would be insuffi-
cient; a complete reconsideration of the entire ballot access procedure by the West
Virginia Legislature is warranted. The following subsections are proposed revisions
to West Virginia's ballot access laws.
'o, See text accompanying supra notes 52-53.
04 Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d 634. See also Comment, supra note 99.
'o' Piccirillo, 160 W. Va. 329, 233 S.E.2d 419.
,"6 Brewer, 151 W. Va. 113, 150 S.E.2d 592.
,07 Piccirillo, 160 W. Va. at 333, 233 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Brewer, 151 W. Va. 113, 150 S.E.2d
592). Although freedom of association and speech were not asserted in Piccirillo, the court noted that
the test would be similar to the enunciated equal protection test with only "moderating" distinctions
as to the mechanical aspects of registration. Piccirillo, 160 W. Va. at 334 n.6, 233 S.E.2d at 423 n.6.
'o' Piccirillo, 160 W. Va. at 333, 233 S.E.2d at 423. W. VA. CONST. art. III §§ 7, 16, 17.
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A. Magisterial District Petitioning
A major party's candidate normally has his name placed on the ballot in a
general election through selection at a convention or a primary election.
The West Virginia Code provides another method for nonmajor party
candidates.' °9 The candidate is required to submit a petition signed by a number
of voters equal to at least one percent of the number of votes cast for the office
in the last general election, but not less than twenty-five. However, prior to the
Liberation Party decision in 1980, the statute had severely restricted the petitioning
process for nonmajor party candidates by imposing geographical limitations on where
signatures could be solicited by petitioners. (The term petitioner refers to a campaign
worker who solicits signatures on behalf of a specific candidate.) Petitioners were
only allowed to solicit signatures from those registered voters who resided within
the petitioner's own magisterial district.
Magisterial districts once served as the political subdivisions from which justices
of the peace and constables were elected, but that system has since been replaced
by countywide election of magistrates." 0 Because the magisterial district is no longer
a functioning political subdivision, it is unlikely that either the voter or the petitioner
knows where a magisterial district begins or ends. Although each county contains
-several magisterial districts, there are wide variations in number and size.", The
law precluded a petitioner from soliciting in areas where many citizens from dif-
ferent magisterial districts would tend to congregate, such as downtown commercial
districts. This restriction increased the number of petitioners, as well as the amount
of time and money, required to successfully complete a petition drive. Even the
candidate's personal petitioning activities were restricted to gathering signatures
within his own small magisterial 'district.
In Libertarian Party, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals struck down
the magisterial district provision as a violation of the equal protection clauses of
both the state and federal constitutions. The court could find no compelling state
interest to justify the substantial burdens placed on a third-party or independent
candidate by the magisterial district restriction."' The West Virginia election laws
should be rewritten to reflect the court's decision which removed the magisterial
,o9 W. VA. CODE § 3-5-23 (1979).
"I The changeover to a magisterial court system was initiated by the Judicial Reorganization Amend-
ment of 1974. See Com. Sub. for Senate Joint Resolution No. 6, 1974 W. Va. Acts at p. 946. There
is no relationship between the old political subdivision of magisterial district and the newer elective
office of magistrate.
.. W. VA. CODE § 7-2-2 (1984), requires that counties have three to ten magisterial districts and
that, within the county, magisterial districts should be nearly equal in population and territory. However,
the size of the districts varies widely from county to county. Kanawha County, with the largest popula-
tion in the state, has only five magisterial districts, while Wirt County, with the smallest population,
has seven districts. This Code provision had the effect of fragmenting state ballot access efforts and
denied petitioners geographic mobility beyond the district limits.
-2 Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d at 642.
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district restriction. The statute should make it clear that petitioners are allowed
to obtain signatures in any area involved in the election.
B. Credentials Requirement
An issue related to magisterial district petitioning that should be reconsidered
is the credentials requirement found in West Virginia Code section 3-5-23(b). The
statute requires petitioners to obtain from the county clerk, a credentials form which
must be exhibited to a voter before soliciting his signature. The credentials form
lists the petitioner's name, address, and magisterial district plus the candidate's
name and the office sought. The form expressly authorizes the petitioner to solicit
signatures only from voters residing within the magisterial district.
The plaintiffs in Libertarian Party challenged the credentials provision as a
violation of the first amendment to the United States Constitution. The court first
found that the provisions was not impermissibly vague. The court then upheld the
statute, finding that it was justified by a substantial state interest in assuring the
integrity of the signature solicitation process.
The court noted that the regulation "prevents or reduces the opportunity for
the bogus solicitor, promoted by adversary candidates, to reduce the pool of potential
petition signers in a fraudulent petition drive, or to misrepresent himself as the
candidate's supporter and then abuse the electorate by alienating them from the
candidate's legitimate solicitors.""' 3 The court cited All the President's Men as a
source for examples of "dirty tricks" that are used in political campaigns.1"
The court's reasoning in sustaining this provision is questionable for several
reasons. In its analysis of the magisterial district restriction the court required the
State to show a compelling state interest." 5 However, the court applied the lower
standard of a substantial state interest in determining that the credentials require-
ment was justified.' 6 It is unclear why the court chose to use this lower standard.
West Virginia's credentials requirement is, in effect, a license to petition. For
many years, licensing laws for first amendment activities have been viewed with
disfavor in cases before the United States Supreme Court."' Some of these cases
involved limitations on leafleting and canvassing. In Lovell v. Griffin,' a Georgia
"I Id. at 643.
11 Id.
"I Id. at 642.
16 Survey of Developments-Election Law, 83 W. Va. L. Rev. 271, 334 (1980).
"I See Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Southeastern Prods., Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Staub v. Baxley,
355 U.S. 313 (1958); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
" Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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city ordinance which forbade any distribution of literature was declared void. A
year later, four similar ordinances prohibiting the distribution of leaflets were
challenged in the consolidated cases decided under Schneider v. State."19 Efforts
were made to distinguish these ordinances from the one voided in Lovell because
they had been passed to prevent either frauds, disorder, or littering. The court refused
to uphold the challenged ordinances, noting that frauds, disorder, or littering could
be denounced and punished as separate offenses without impinging upon first amend-
ment rights.
This reasoning is appropriate to the credentials requirement as well. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the statutory credentials requirement
in order to protect nonmajor party campaigns from "dirty tricks" perpetrated by
their competitions. If such illegal campaign tactics are a problem, the perpetrators
themselves should be punished through existing laws. The solution is not to restrict
the first amendment rights of the victims.
In 1959, the plaintiffs in Talley v. California'0 challenged a city ordinance
that required a handbill to have the name and address of the person who prepared,
distributed, or sponsored it to be printed on its face. The United States Supreme
Court overruled the ordinance and emphasized the historical importance of anonymi-
ty in political affairs. The Court said that "identification and fear of reprisal might
deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance." ' 2' This same
concern should apply to petitioners working for nonmajor party candidates in West
Virginia.
Recent developments in related areas could affect the validity of the credentials'
requirement. The United States Supreme Court has several times expressed its con-
cern about harassment and violence directed at minor parties.' 2 In the landmark
election reform case of Buckley v. Valeo,'2 3 the Federal Election Campaign Act
was challenged on several fronts.'2 There were numerous appellants in the case,
representing a broad spectrum of political interests. The case raised a number of
significant issues. One such issue, advanced by minor parties, concerned disclosure
requirements. They maintained that, in order to protect the rights of their supporters,
minor parties should not be required to 'conform to the same reporting and disclosure
requirements as the Republican or Democratic parties.'"
11 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
120 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
I2 d. at 65.
122 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm. 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
"IS Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
124 2 U.S.C. § 431-455 (1982).
'2, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 72.
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While recognizing the existence of a potential for harm from the disclosure
of identities of nonmajor parties' supporters, the Supreme Court stopped short
of granting a blanket exception for such parties. However, the Court did establish
a test for determining when the first amendment requires the exemption of minor
parties from compelled disclosures: "The evidence offered need show only a
reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names
will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government
officials or private parties."' 26
The Buckley test was extended by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Socialist
Workers' '74 Campaign Committee.'27 This case successfully challenged Ohio laws
which required the disclosure not only of campaign contributors, but also the
recipients of disbursements of campaign funds. The Court not only approved the
extended application of the Buckley test, but also reaffirmed that minor parties
would be safeguarded from compelled disclosures which jeopardized first amend-
ment rights. Justice Marshall's majority opinion concluded by stating:
The First Amendment prohibits a State from compelling disclosures by a minor
party that will subject those persons identified to the reasonable probability of threats,
harrassments, or reprisals. Such disclosures would infringe the First Amendment
rights of the party and its members and supporters. In light of the substantial
evidence of past and present hostility from private persons and government officials
against the SWP [Socialist Workers' Party], Ohio's campaign disclosure requirements
cannot be constitutionally applied to the Ohio SWP.'
2
'
The first amendment rights that gave rise to the Buckley exception for minor
parties should also apply to credentials requirements. In all likelihood, West
Virginia's credentials requirement would now be considered an unconstitutional
disclosure as a result of Brown at least as to ariy party that can show evidence
of harassment.' 29
The record in Libertarian Party reveals that many potential petitioners in West
Virginia have encountered employees in the county clerk's offices who ranged from
uncooperative to abusive. 3 ' Many of these employees have been hired by a major
party incumbent and view those petitioning for nonmajor party candidates as a
threat to the current political powers and, thus, their job security. Petitioners who
were quite willing to solicit for a candidate may feel their enthusiasm wane when
confronted by such harassment before the job has even begun. Compounding this
reluctance is a realization that potential petitioners must place their names and other
126 Id. at 74.
12 Brown v. Socialist Workers' '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
1 Id. at 102.
,29 This requirement would also now be considered an unconstitutional disclosure where evidence
of expected harassment can be shown by new parties. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
,10 See Comment, supra note 99, at 241.
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identifying information on file at the courthouse before they may begin soliciting
signatures. The violence that resulted from the Socialist Workers' Party parade
in Charleston, West Virginia in 19801 is evidence that any fears of harassment
experienced by nonmajor party candidates and their supporters are more than
speculative.
Because the credentials requirement was justified primarily as a means to
implement the magisterial district requirement, it would have been logical to expect
that the credentials requirement would have fallen in the wake of removal of the
magisterial district requirement. Surprisingly, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals chose to upheld the former, even though it had struck down the latter.
Although the court did not hold the credentials provision constitutionally infirm
the provision should be deleted by the legislature because it meets the exemption
test as articulated by the Supreme Court in Buckley. The burden it imposes on
nonmajor party candidates now outweighs any usefulness it might have. Absent
credentials requirements, the campaigns themselves can be responsible for screen-
ing who receives their official petitions, as is the practice in other states.
C. Filing Fees
Filing fees are designated for all elective offices according to West Virginia
Code section 3-5-8. Most fees are based on one percent of the annual salary of
the office sought. Nonmajor party candidates are required by West Virginia Code
section 3-5-23 to file a letter of intent and pay a filing fee prior to commencing
their petition drive.
In Libertarian Party, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals said that
the failure to provide a reasonable alternative to filing fees for impecunious
candidates is unconstitutional as to such candidates.'32 This holding should be
codified in any election law reform. The secretary of state now allows impecunious
candidates to run without the payment of a filing fee.'33
Those who do not quite qualify as impecunious may also be adversely affected,
and thus additional changes are warranted. An acknowledged purpose of filing
fees is to dissuade nonserious candidates from running. But overly high filing fees
can dissuade qualified, serious candidates, who cannot reasonably afford the filing
"I May Day Demonstrators Attacked by City Crowd, Charleston Gazette, May 2, 1980 at 1, col. 3.
M32 Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d at 639. It is interesting to note that the court made no attempt
to define "impecunious." There being no specific guidelines, the secretary of state is free to determine
fee waiver eligibility on a case by case basis. A suitable definition of "impecunious" should be included
as a part of election law reform.
" Telephone interview with Charlotte Cox, Elections Division Director, Secretary of State's Office
(September 27, 1984).
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fees from running, while less highly motivated wealthy candidates enjoy relatively
easy entrance to the race. 134 For example, a candidate for governor must pay $600
in order to begin his petition drive, regardless of its eventual success. For many,
this is quite a sizeable sum on which to gamble.
It is arguable that West Virginia's filing fees are too high and can adversely
affect potential nonmajor party candidates as well as Republicans and Democrats.
Nonmajor party candidates are further disadvantaged because they must pay the
filing fee whether they eventually appear on the ballot or not. Regardless of whether
the filing fees are lowered, a more equitable arrangement would be to have the
minor party candidate file the required letter of intent and to begin petitioning
but defer payment of filing fees until the candidate has collected the required number
of signatures. Under this proposed change, the nonmajor party candidate would
be paying, not for the privilege of collecting signatures, but for appearing on the
ballot.
This is, in essence, the privilege for which major party candidates are currently
paying, and no state interest would be compromised by such a modification.
Accordingly, a gubernatorial candidate who makes just enough money to prevent
him from qualifying as impecunious could still try to get on the ballot without
wagering $600 on the outcome of the petition drive. If he succeeded in garnering
enough citizen support through signatures, he could then pay his filing fee know-
ing that he will be on the ballot. This additional time period, in conjunction with
the heightened exposure as a result of the petitioning process, would make it easier
for such a candidate to raise the necessary funds.
In State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that a $100 property requirement was an unconstitutional
restriction on city council candidates. 35 The court declared that the right to become
a candidate was a fundamental right under the equal protection clause of the state
constitution.'3 6 Allowing nonmajor party candidates to pay at the time they present
their petitions would be an alternative that is less burdensome on that fundamental
right to run for office. West Virginia should adopt this reasonable change.
D. Filing Deadlines
Before 1984 nonmajor party candidates were required to have filed their declara-
tion of candidacy and paid their filing fee no later than thirty-one days prior to
the primary election as provided by West Virginia Code Section 3-5-23. The deadline
for turning in the requisite number of petition signatures was the day before the
" See Bullock, 405 U.S. 134; and Lubin, 415 U.S. 709.
"' Piccirillo, 160 W. Va. 329, 233 S.E.2d 419.
,36 Id. at 334, 233 S.E.2d at 423.
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primary, according to West Virginia Code section 3-5-24. This early deadline, months
before the deadline for major parties to announce their nominees for the general
election, presented a serious obstacle for nonmajor party candidates.
The plaintiffs in Libertarian Party v. Manchin attempted to extend the deadline.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declined to do so stating that the
difference in deadlines for regular party candidates and nonmajor party candidates
did not violate equal protection principles.'37 However, the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze made it unconstitutional for
states to impose deadlines for nonmajor party candidates that are substantially dif-
ferent from the deadlines for major party candidates to be placed on the general
election ballot. 138
In response to that decision, Secretary of State A. James Manchin, by consent,
adopted new and fairer deadlines. Nonmajor party candidates must file their letter
of intent and fees before July 5. They then have until September 7 to turn in the
required signatures.' 39 Since these new deadlines substantially conform to the Ander-
son v. Celebrezze decision, they should be incorporated into West Virginia's statutes.
They afford equal treatment to both major and nonmajor party candidates in accord
with constitutional guarantees.
E. Primary Vote Forfeiture Provision
One reason the day before the primary had been established as the deadline
for turning in the requisite petition signatures in West Virginia was that, by judicial
construction of West Virginia Code Section 3-5-23(c), a petition signature is deemed
to be the equivalent of a primary vote.'" In other words, by the terms of West
Virginia Code Section 3-5-23(c), signing a petition forced a voter to forfeit the right
to vote in the primary.
The plaintiffs in Libertarian Party challenged this provision but were denied
relief. The court noted that sometimes major party voters are faced with a primary
ballot on which their party has been unable to field candidates for every office.", 1
This is definitely an inequitable exchange, since the voter who signs a petition for
117 Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d at 646.
"I Anderson, 460 U.S. 780; W. VA. CODE § 3-5-19 (1984), allows major parties to fill any vacant
nominations as late as 60 days prior to the general election.
'39 Telephone interview with Charlotte Cox, Elections Division Director, Secretary of State's Office
(September 27, 1984).
"I See State ex rel. Daily Gazette Co. v. Bailey, 152 W. Va. 521, 164 S.E.2d 414 (1968). See
M. STEDMAN, JR., STATE AND LocAL GovERN.4z~s, 74-77 (1976). See also Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d
at 647.
Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d at 647.
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a single candidate for a particular office thereby loses the right to vote for all other
offices on the primary ballot, not just a few vacant ballot slots.
This is a difficult sacrifice, even for a candidate's most ardent supporters. It
is unfair to force them to give up their right (indeed, their duty) to vote. That
West Virginia has traditionally been considered a predominately one-party state' 2
exacerbates the unfairness because, in many races, the primary is where the real
election occurs for state and local offices. Thus, a petitioner seeking signatures
for a presidential candidate finds many state voters reluctant to give up their all-
important primary vote for the lower offices. Likewise, it is difficult to persuade
people to give up their right to vote for higher offices such as president or governor
in order to sign a petition for a nonmajor party candidate seeking a local office.
As a result of Anderson v. Celebrezze, the deadline for filing a letter of intent,
as well as the deadline for submitting the required signatures, has been moved so
that it now falls after the primary. ' 3 It is now possible that a nonmajor party
candidate would not even announce until after the primary, thus foreclosing sup-
port in the form of petition signatures from those people who have already cast
votes in a party's primary. Ironically, an exceptional nonmajor party candidate
who attracts bipartisan support may find it difficult to obtain ballot access due
to this vote waiver provision because potential supporters who had voted in the
primary would be ineligible to help place him on the ballot for the general election.
The judicial construction declaring a petition signature to be the equivalent
of a primary vote appeared in State ex rel. Daily Gazette Co. v. Bailey.'" The
peculiar circumstances of the case and the exigency of the situation under which
it was decided make it probable that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
did not fully appreciate the impact of such a declaration.
The narrow three to two decision involved an attempt by a prominent newspaper
editor and acknowledged opponent of George Wallace and the American Indepen-
dent Party to publish the names of all of Wallace's petition signers. By equating
these signatures with votes, the court prevented their publication and thereby pre-
served what the court perceived to be their secrecy. However, the secrecy of a petition
signature is illusory. In collecting signatures, each person who signs is free to see
the preceding names on the petition. In addition, campaign workers and government
clerks have access to the names as the petitions are processed and cross checked.
The court's rationale for equating the petition signature with a vote is thus flawed.
The statutory language is bad enough. This decision represents continued movement
in the wrong direction.
'42 M. STEDMAN, JR., supra note 140, at 74-77. See also Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d at 647.
"I See text accompanying supra note 139.
'4 Daily Gazette, 152 W. Va. 521, 164 S.E.2d 414.
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Clearly, the primary vote forfeiture provision should be removed. A signature
on a nonmajor party candidate's petition is not the same as a primary election
vote. It is merely a statement that the voter wishes to have, in addition to the
Republican and Democratic nominees, that candidate as an alternative choice
available on the general election ballot. This support should not be equated with
an ultimate vote for the candidate in question. Nor should registered voters who
have cast ballots in the primary be foreclosed from expressing their desire for the
added choice of nonmajor party candidates on the November ballot, now that a
post-primary deadline has been established. Such a restriction might be deemed
to impinge upon first amendment rights.
A proposed reform would therefore include the freedom for all registered voters
to sign petitions without forfeiting their valuable right to vote in the primary. All
language to the contrary should be excised from the applicable sections of West
Virginia's election statutes. This would include West Virginia Code section 3-5-23(0,
which provides penalties of up to $1000 as well as imprisonment for up to one
year for violations of the primary vote forfeiture provision. This stiff penalty was
the basis for fear and confusion among voters who were considering signing a non-
major party petition prior to the 1980 primary.' 5
Abandoning the primary vote forfeiture provision would provide a further
benefit by alleviating the need to cross-check petition signatures with the records
of who voted in the primary election.
F. Possible Write-in Alternative
It is not unlikely that sentiment in the partisan West Virginia legislature will
be opposed to opening the petition process to all voters. If so, there is a possible
compromise. This proposal would be slightly more complex than opening the peti-
tion process to all voters but it would allow voters wishing to support a ballot
access effort by a nonmajor party candidate to retain the right to vote in the primary.
Justice McGraw, in a separate opinion in Libertarian Party, suggested the
possibility of utilizing write-in votes by registered independents during the primary
to qualify nonmajor party candidates for a slot on the general election ballot.",
This method by itself is an unworkable and unacceptable solution. Registered
independents cannot vote in primary elections, unless there is a nonpartisan contest
or question for consideration that day, such as a school board election or a proposed
constitutional amendment. 1, 7 Very few registered independents bother to vote even
"' Signers Could Pay $1000 Fine If They Vote on Partisan Issues, Charleston Gazette, May 29,
1980, at B6, col. 4.
"' Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d at 648 (McGraw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141 W. VA. CoDE § 3-4-19 (1979), authorizes independents to vote in primary elections under these
specific circumstances.
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when such nonpartisan matters are on the primary ballot. Therefore, to limit a
nonmajor party candidate to achieving ballot access by gaining write-in votes from
only registered independents on primary election day would be even more burden-
some to potential nonmajor party candidates than the existing system. Also, the
method that Justice McGraw suggests would be based solely on West Virginia's
June primary, thus preventing compliance with the Anderson v. Celebrezze holding
regarding early deadlines. Finally, this proposal ignores the problem of major party
voters who often desire to support particular nonmajor party candidates, but cannot
do so without forfeiting their right to vote for other offices on the ballot.
The following proposal is an adaptation of Justice McGraw's position, which
might prove more acceptable to the West Virginia legislature. This would entail
allowing any nonmajor party candidate who filed at a given deadline prior to the
primary, to campaign for write-in votes from voters of either party. Those voters
would then be able to select the remainder of the ballot according to their personal
preference. They would be afforded absolute secrecy and, most importantly, would
not be forfeiting their vote for all other offices.
The existing primary ballot system allows for write-in candidates seeking their
party's nomination. The voter must "write in" the candidate's name at the proper
place on the ballot. For example, if a member of the Democratic Party decides
to try a write-in candidacy for the Democratic nomination for governor, then all
Democratic ballot votes for him would count. Write-in campaigns are rarely
attempted, however, because of their inherent disadvantage when competing against
printed names already on the ballot.
Under this compromise method, nonmajof party candidates would be seeking
write-in votes merely to demonstrate their support and to thus achieve ballot access.
Such a candidate could choose to announce before the pre-primary deadline and
campaign for write-in votes from all primary voters, regardless of registration, which
would then be credited towards his required signature total. If he received more
votes than the required number of signatures, he would automatically qualify for
the general election ballot without petitioning. If the total fell short of that mark,
the candidate would then have until September 7 to solicit enough petition signatures
for voters not participating in the primary and independents to put him over the
minimum required figure.' 8 The nonmajor party candidate would have to file prior
to the primary in order to use the write-in vote process enabling those counting
the ballots to be officially notified of his write-in effort and, in effect, according
such votes automatic validation. Indeed, this process would save government admin-
istration expenses involved in ballot access efforts because every vote counted would
be one less petition signature to be separately validated under the normal procedure.
', This is the new deadline date established by the secretary of state in 1984. See text accompany-
ing supra note 139.
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The write-in provision cannot be used as the only method for achieving ballot
access. The U.S. Supreme Court in Lubin v. Panish,'4 9 discounted the viability
of write-in votes as the sole alternative to ballot access provisions and said, "[A
candidate] relegated to the write-in provision would be forced to rest his chances
solely upon those voters who would remember his name and take the affirmative
step of writing it on the ballot."' 0 Additionally, sole reliance on write-in votes
during the primary would force an early deadline on nonmajor party candidates
thereby encountering the difficulties addressed in Anderson v. Celebrezze. Thus,
the petitioning process must be available, with the primary write-in option serving
as a supplementary method of obtaining the requisite number of signatures.
G. "Desire to Vote for" Language
West Virginia Code section 3-5-23(d) directs that the ballot access petition form
should state that the signers "desire to vote for said candidates." Such a declara-
tion is tantamount to being forced to reveal publicly how a citizen will vote in
the election and would undoubtedly inhibit some supporters from signing. Those
who are not sure yet exactly which candidate they will support, but who would
be interested in having that nonmajor party candidate as a choice available to them
in November, may also be inhibited by such language on the petition. As explained
earlier, a petition signature should not be the equivalent of a vote.
The Sixth Circuit struck down a similar "desire to vote for" provision in
Kentucky's election laws. The court, in Anderson v. Mills,'' stated:
The declaration operates to discourage from participation in the electoral process
simply because they do not wish people to know how they will vote. Such a revela-
tion invokes the fears sought to be quelled by the secrecy of voting laws in this
country, and subjects an elector to the pressure of his neighbors, employers, and
social peers. Since the declaration abridges the right to a secret ballot in such a
direct and unacceptable manner, it cannot stand." 2
A recent federal district court likewise declared such a provision as an unlawful
and unconstitutional invasion of privacy and of the secret ballot in Libertarian
Party of Nebraska v. Beerman.'" It is doubtful that West Virginia's "desire to
vote for" provision could withstand judicial challenge. In light of these decisions
and in combination with the preceding arguments against equating a signature with
a vote, it is obvious that this "desire to vote for" language can no longer validly
be required on petitions.
"4 Lubin, 415 U.S. 709.
110 Id. at 719.
"' Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981).
352 Id. at 608-09.
Libertarian Party of Nebraska v, Beerman, No. 84-L-451, slip op. at 3 (D. Neb. July 30, 1984).
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H. Independent Candidacy Recognition
The ability of a candidate to run for office as a nonaffiliated independent
candidate without a formalized party structure is new to American politics. Until
the last decade, most states, including West Virginia, had no provisions for candi-
dacies outside of political parties. Indeed, fifteen states and the District of Columbia
flatly prohibited a person independent of any political party from running.'
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Storer v. Brown'5' invalidated California statutory
requirements that tended to force an independent candidate either to join a political
party or form a new political party.' 6 The Court noted, in essence, that an aversion
to political parties might be the very reason a candidate chooses to run as an
independent. '17
In 1976, independent presidential candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy relied
on this ruling in his attempts to achieve ballot access. McCarthy received only one
percent of the vote, but he was eventually successful in virtually all of his judicial
battles.' As a result, election laws of twenty-four states were altered or struck
down by McCarthy's challenges.5 9 Due to the restrictiveness of this State's ballot
access laws, McCarthy did not run in West Virginia in 1976.160
Although there is no express prohibition against independent candidacies in
West Virginia's statutory language, there is an overall impression that such
candidacies are disapproved. This impression is conveyed by continued reference
to minor parties, party names, party emblems, and the requirement that a party
name appear on the credentials application, petition form, and elsewhere.' 6 '
The Supreme Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Libertarian Party, in
which Congressman John Anderson was allowed to intervene as a plaintiff during
his presidential campaign as an independent candidate. The court held that
nonaffiliated, independent candidates should be eligible to run in West Virginia.' 2
This holding should be reflected in any revision of the election laws.
' Armor & Marcus, The Bloodless Revolution of 1976, 63 A.B.A. J. 1108 (1977).
"' Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 745-46.
" Armor & Marcus, supra note 154, at 1110.
"' Id at 1108.
16 McCarthy filed an amicus brief for the case of Harless v. McCartney, No. 76-0293-CH, (S.D.
W. Va., Sept. 30, 1976) (mem.) which challenged West Virginia's ballot access laws. The court upheld
West Virginia's laws, thus preventing McCarthy from obtaining ballot access. This was the only decision
against McCarthy on the constitutional points and was considered "an anomoly in the trend of ballot
access cases" at that time. Armor & Marcus, supra note 154, at 1110.
,6, See generally W. VA. CODE § 3-5-23.
Libertarian Party, 270 S.E.2d at 640.
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I. Official Party Recognition Requirements
The Democrats and the Republicans are the only officially recognized political
parties in West Virginia, enabling them to hold primary elections, register voters
by party affiliation, supply poll workers, and so forth. The threshold requirement
for official political party recognition in West Virginia is the attainment of at least
ten percent of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial race."63 This makes West
Virginia one of the four most restrictive states in the nation," 4 not only because
of the high percentage of actual voter support required, but also because that
relatively high standard can be met only in one statewide race which occurs only
once every four years." ' Colorado, one of three other restrictive states, has the
same requirements as West Virginia. In a 1984 case, Baer v. Meyer,16 a federal
district court noted that "[i]ronically, a third party whose candidate had just been
elected President of the United States would not qualify as a protected 'political
party' under Colorado law, and such a party would still be at a disadvantage in
competing with the Republicans and Democrats in the next general election."" 7
The Tenth Circuit's review of the lower court's decision in Baer v. Meyer did not
reach the constitutional questions relied on below.168
The disadvantages to minor parties of not being able to benefit from official
political party recognition are numerous. If such rules had been in place- during
the 1800s, it is doubtful that either the Republicans or Democrats would have ever
risen to their current dominance. The Federal Election Commission uses five per-
cent as its minimum threshold figure for providing funding for presidential candi-
dates. Had John Anderson chosen to run again in 1984, his seven percent total
from 1980 would have qualified him for Federal Election Commission funding.' 69
Restrictive election rules which serve only to "maintain the political status quo"
are unconstitutional. "0 West Virginia's official recognition rule would appear to
fall under this category. A five percent threshold like that used by the Federal Elec-
tion Commission would be a fair requirement for any statewide race and would
constitute a sufficient showing of support to justify granting the benefits of major
party status.
W63 V. VA. CODE § 3-5-22.
'6 See Baer v. Meyer, 577 F. Supp. 838, 846 (D. Colo.), aff'd in relevant part, 728 F.2d 471
(10th Cir. 1984).
16 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 1-1-104(18) (1980).
,66 Baer, 577 F. Supp. 838.
167 Id. at 844.
Baer v. Meyer, 728 F.2d 471, 474-75 (10th Cir. 1984).
11 C.F.R. § 9004.2 (1984).
,,0 Arutunoff v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375, 1378 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 913 (1983).
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J. Sore Loser Provisions
As a result of the petition deadline being moved to after the primary, some
unsuccessful local candidates around the state have considered running as a third
party or independent candidates for the offices they had sought.""1 Reaction to
this may spur interest by incumbents in a "sore loser" provision which would pro-
hibit a major party candidate who is defeated in the primary from seeking ballot
access as a candidate from another party or as an independent. Succinctly stated,
under such a provision, if a candidate loses in the primary, he can't run.
Such statutes have been upheld by the courts.'72 However, a distinction has
been made in the case of presidential caididates. In Anderson v. Mills,' Kentucky's
sore loser provision was found inapplicable to presidential candidates. Since losing
in that state's primary does not preclude a major party presidential candidate from
ultimately appearing on the Kentucky general election ballot if indeed he is later
selected at his party's convention, it is clear that the provision does not apply to
the two major parties. The court questioned the constitutionality of applying the
sore loser provision to presidential candidates.'74
The impact of this reasoning on lower offices is unclear. However, it should
be noted that the adoption of sore loser provisions in West Virginia would have
an effect on the two major parties as well. There have been various instances in
which Republicans or Democrats have switched parties in order to run for office.
For example in 1984, Monongalia County Democrat magisterial candidate John
Marko was defeated in the primary and was later named to fill a vacancy on the
Republican ballot.' A sore loser provision would not have permitted his Republican
candidacy.
Closley related to sore loser provisions are disaffiliation requirements. These
require a candidate to have been a registered member of his party for a specified
time before being eligible to run for office as a member of that party. The practical
effect of disaffiliation requirements is the same as a sore loser provision. The
Supreme Court in Storer v. Brown, upheld a California statute which required
candidates to have been a member of their party at least one year prior to running.'7 6
Again in Monongalia County, such a provision would have excluded the candidacy
of former Morgantown Republican Mayor Florence Merow, who won nomination
to the House of Delegates in the 1984 Democratic primary. 77
"' See Third Party Ruling May Turn Election into 3-ring Circus, Beckley Post-Herald, August
1, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
See Storer, 415 U.S. 724.
Anderson, 664 F.2d 600.
" Id. at 605.
' Republicans Nominate Three, Morgantown Dominion Post, August 27, 1984, at A5, col.1.
'76 Storer, 415 U.S. at 733-34.
' Florence Merow Enters Democrat Race for House, Morgantown Dominion Post, April 1, 1984,
at B2, col.5.
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Since such party-switching has often happened in West Virginia electoral history
without threatening the system, the imposition of sore loser provisions or disaf-
filiation requirements are unnecessary. Voters are capable of deciding if they want
someone who has changed parties. It is therefore unnecessary to rely on inflexible,
artificial election statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the preceding arguments that a total revision of West Virginia's
ballot access laws is warranted. Since the newly elected secretary of state has
expressed interest in a major reform of West Virginia's election laws as a whole,2""
it is imperative that ballot access laws be included in such an endeavor. The rights
of minor party and independent candidates should be recognized and enlarged in
light of recent judicial decisions.
Constitutional guarantees demand that the Democrats and Republicans refrain
from continuing monopolistic election regulations enacted during this century. In
a country that espouses political freedom, Americans must become accustomed again
to more than two choices on the general election ballot. Tolerance of diverse political
ideas is essential to our freedom and something for Americans to be proud of.
American voters, however, must make intelligent decisions about which candidates
they wish to see on the ballot. A balance must be struck between denying constitu-
tional rights and guarding against a plethora of nonserious or frivolous candidates
on the ballot. Nevertheless, the legislature should rely more on the judgment of
the voters and less on restrictive, inflexible laws to accomplish that balance. Our
political arena should be a free market of competing ideas so that we might better
pursue our forefather's vision of democracy.
David Kurtz
'" See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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